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Abstract 
After the Lisbon treaty came into effect in 2009 the European Commission lost its position as the main 
representative of the European Union in external affairs to the High Representative of Foreign affairs 
and the newly established External Action Service. This thesis explores why the European 
Commission despite the new treaty has remained a major player in External Affairs. European 
Commission power retention is analysed through two multiple case studies. One exploring the 
function of the External Action Service and making a comparative analysis with the European 
Commission and another exploring the involvement of the European Commission in the policy areas 
directly linked to the external dimension of the Union. Historical institutionalism and role theory as 
well as a look on institutional overlap are employed to analyse the methods used by the European 
Commission to retain its position in External Affairs. This paper makes the conclusion that the 
European Commission has been successful in retaining power through a varied method of long-term 
policy development, multi-lateral frameworks of foreign policy negotiations, policy overlapping to 
maximise use of mandate and path dependency of expertise based legitimacy to create a policy legacy 
with other European Union institutions. 
Key words: Power retention, European Commission, European External Action Service, Historical 
Institutionalism, Institutional overlap  
Simon	Axbrink	Jönsson	 	 STVM23	
Department	of	Political	Science	 	 Tutor:	Magnus	Jerneck	
3	
Contents 
Introduction	............................................................................................................................................	4	
Method	....................................................................................................................................................	6	
Research Problem	...............................................................................................................................	6	
Disposition	..........................................................................................................................................	6	
Methods of Analysis	...........................................................................................................................	7	
Material and Sources	..........................................................................................................................	7	
Considerations and Demarcation	........................................................................................................	8	
Theory	...................................................................................................................................................	10	
Historical Institutionalism: Inertia in institutional authority	.............................................................	10	
Institutional Overlap	.........................................................................................................................	11	
Toward a theory to analyse the European Commission	....................................................................	12	
Role Theory and its application to the European Commission	.........................................................	13	
Analysis	................................................................................................................................................	15	
Comparative Analysis: The EEAS in Foreign Affairs	......................................................................	15	
The FPI: The Go-between	.............................................................................................................	15	
Commission vs. EEAS influence a matter of negotiation structure or policy area?	......................	16	
Energy in the EEAS	......................................................................................................................	16	
Climate change: Green diplomacy	................................................................................................	17	
Trade	.............................................................................................................................................	17	
ICT and Communication	..............................................................................................................	18	
Aid and Development	...................................................................................................................	18	
Transport	.......................................................................................................................................	19	
CSDP and CFSP	...........................................................................................................................	20	
Multiple Case Study: The European Commission’s Roles in Foreign Affairs	..................................	20	
Energy: The Facilitator	.................................................................................................................	20	
Climate Change: The Negotiator	..................................................................................................	22	
Trade: The Leader	.........................................................................................................................	23	
ICT and Communications: The Enabler	.......................................................................................	24	
Aid and Development: The Investor	.............................................................................................	26	
Transport: The Forum Builder	......................................................................................................	28	
CSDP and CFSP	...........................................................................................................................	29	
Discussion	.............................................................................................................................................	31	
Conclusion	............................................................................................................................................	35	
Bibliography	..........................................................................................................................................	36	
Simon	Axbrink	Jönsson	 	 STVM23	
Department	of	Political	Science	 	 Tutor:	Magnus	Jerneck	
4	
 
Introduction 
Before the Lisbon treaty established in 2009 the European Commission was responsible for 
representing the European Union abroad. In the treaty this all changed by the extended powers of the 
High Representative of Foreign Affairs. The treaty explicitly states:  
“2. The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and 
security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall 
express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences. 
3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and 
shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States./…/” 
(European Union, 2010) 
This clearly shifted the legal power of representation abroad from the European Commission to the 
High Representative and the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS). The treaty 
goes on to state that the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy shall be decided by the 
Council and only approved by the Commission and the parliament. The full extent of the 
Commission’s power as legislated is to be called upon to give the HR the resources required to fulfil a 
policy goal and if necessary work in liaison with the European Defence Agency. Finally, the HR also 
needs the Commission’s support when relaying a question of importance to the council. (European 
Union, 2010) 
In short; this should spell the end of the European Commission’s place in EU external relations. Its 
duties being carried out by the EEAS and its representative power being taken over by the HR where 
necessary. The Commission’s position would seem to be internal and transnational between the 
borders of the member states only. However, since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon this has as will be shown 
by this essay, not been the case. This piece of research will investigate “Why the European 
Commission is still a major player in European external relations in a post-Lisbon Europe.” 
This study is of interest due to the fact that there is a need to understand the European Commission’s 
use of its new roles in external relations to retain the power it had before the treaty changed. This is 
imperative to understand EU external relations in the new institutional framework and may add to the 
debate of what the EEAS and the High Representatives actual functions are by contrasting them to the 
functions already carried out by the European Commission in this area. As the European Union takes a 
more and more prominent position on the world stage and with new challenges to the stability of 
Eastern Europe the coordination of the European External Relations is more relevant to discuss than 
ever. 
A basis for this piece of work is the fact that the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty never specified 
how the institutional setting would work in practice. While many authors have previously attempted to 
examine the power of the newly established EEAS and the authority of the empowered High 
representative of foreign affairs. This paper will attempt to explain the position of the European 
Commission in external affairs. How it has changed from in the post-Lisbon European Union and how 
its power has remained largely unchanged despite the new roles and methods that has to be used by the 
Commission to function as an external actor.  
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There are no shortage of articles assessing the effectiveness or performance of the Union and the 
EEAS post-Lisbon, often discussing a specific area. Marangoni and Vanhoonacker (Marangoni & 
Vanhoonacker, 2015) for example discusses Zimbabwe post-Lisbon while Baltag and Smith views 
performance in Ukraine and Moldova (Baltag & Smith, 2015). Most of which focuses on the HR or 
the EEAS. Goldthau and Sitter focuses on the performance of the EC externally but does so only in the 
external relations in Energy (Goldthau & Sitter, 2014). 
Due to the shared mandate of institutions in external relations the EEAS and the EC are unavoidably 
interlinked as stated by Mark Furness the External policy-making of the European Union is pluralistic 
and it is such unclear what positions the diverse institutions involved fill (Furness, 2011). The mandate 
is ‘liquid’ there is an ongoing ‘turf war’ and there is considerable institutional overlap. This makes the 
basis of what this paper will focus on. 
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Method 
Research Problem 
Before the treaty change Common Foreign and Security Policy and external decision-making had a 
divided mandate between the European Commission and the EU council secretariat. The European 
External Action Service was supposed to be a unitary actor in charge of foreign policy as a whole. In 
both making decisions, implementing foreign policy and representing the European Union as its 
diplomatic service. The European Commission would thus seize to fill this function and would be 
decreased to supply expertise and information concerning the relevant policies. 
However, there was no explanation to how the new institutional setting would function and the power 
that the new institution would have let alone which powers would remain in the European 
Commission. This presents a problem in that the mandates are ‘liquid’ changing between institutions 
and tends to be ‘handed over’ more and more to the EEAS as it realises its position within this 
institutional framework. The fact that this is still ongoing despite the treaty being changed in 2009 
highlights the institutional inertia that exists within the union increasing the complexity of mandates 
and powers.  
The powers that remain with the commission can be roughly divided into two types; mandates and 
resources: Mandates where the EC has real formal power which it can utilize and resources which 
relates to the experts employed, the ability to do research on policy-potential and the experience that it 
retains within the relevant policy areas. This together with the agenda and attempts to retain their 
powers in the external dimension leads us to the hypothesis that the European Commission has 
managed to retain most of its powers in the external policies of the union. The question this paper 
poses is why. To reach a conclusion the effects of the inertia needs to be looked at from a perspective 
of historical institutionalist theory which will find the inertia means for power retention of the 
Commission in the context of a treaty change. The current institutional overlap will need to be 
investigated to find if it might benefit the European Commission’s position.  
To collect the findings in a way that explains the current position of the European Commission beyond 
its method of retention and use of the institutional setting role-theory will be applied. In order to create 
a role-set for the European Commission the roles will be divided and explained per policy-area in a 
multiple case study analysis. Secondly to better find the mandate dimension of its powers a 
comparative analysis to the EEAS will be applied to find the mandates that remain and may overlap 
with the EEAS. The final product will be a role-set that appropriately explains what the roles the 
Commission has been taking to assure retention of its current External Relations powers. 
Disposition 
This research will be structured to present the material that has been used to make the appropriate 
analysis. This will include a discussion on if more appropriate areas and sources could have been 
included and an explanation as to why some have been excluded which may have shown other 
findings of value. A discussion on the method of the analysis will follow explaining from which 
perspective the results should be viewed. Then theoretical expectations and findings will be produced 
explaining the phenomena from the perspective of historical institutionalism and setting out the role-
theory utilised to make the empirical findings understandable in a way that has explanatory value for 
the research question. The analysis will then be carried presenting the findings from the multiple case 
study and comparative analysis followed by a discussion of the findings and producing the role set for 
the European Commission. Some concluding remarks will be made. 
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Methods of Analysis 
The conclusions made from this research will rely on two analyses. The first will be a deductive 
comparative multiple case analysis between the EEAS and the European Commission. While this 
paper will focus primarily on the European Commission, the EEAS is imperative in making the 
analysis function as it is the institution taking on many of the Commission’s previous duties in the 
external policy sector due to the diplomatic services it provides. This puts the European Commission 
into the context being discussed and sets out an example to which the EC may be viewed. In external 
affairs the institutional overlap and ‘turf war’ between the two institutions make them remarkably 
similar adding value to the overall research. Finding any way in which the EEAS has been ineffective 
as an institution can be seen as another reason why the EC has been successful to retain power and 
remaining a major player in external affairs. The EEAS will effectively be used a lens in which one 
might clearer see the phenomena of power retention by the EC. This particular study will be 
deductive; aiming to prove that the EC has been the more successful institution. 
Due to the policy division made in the later analysis the comparative analysis will have a research 
design following a point-by-point structure via clearly divided policy areas. The selection of these 
areas will be explained at length under demarcation. 
The second is similar to the extent that it is a multiple case study. It observes the same phenomena 
(power retention) in several observations demarcated by policy areas. Unlike the first analysis it is not 
meant to be comparative although the policy areas certainly can be compared to each other. While the 
research itself explains the phenomena from a pattern of theories it is actual inductive in to the extent 
that it attempts to create a suitable role-theory for the European Commission. The policy areas will 
thus be put into the perspective of a role-set depending on how retention has been achieved (or not 
achieved) in the areas discussed. Each case study is created with the aim to be as objective as possible 
with the exception of the analysis which concludes every case study which is more subjective in nature. 
Both of the analyses are qualitative in nature. And will as such leave room for subjective views. Due 
to the nature of the sources and the information which is not publicly available a quantitative analysis 
would have yielded little if not no information of any value. 
Material and Sources 
Material used for the empirical analysis is primarily retrieved from policy documents and information 
available on the internet regarding policy decisions and reports on foreign policy activities carried out 
by the institutions in question. The EU has websites for each of the Directorate-Generals which 
describes their actions and goals as well as the policy targets they aim to achieve (including the 
Horizon 2020 goals). As using all of this information and these documents would have provided for 
unmanageable amounts of data a selection has been made to narrow it down to its essentials. The 
Directorate-Generals accessed to compile the research has been the General Directorate for Mobility 
and Transport (MOVE), Trade (TRADE), Energy (ENER), Climate Action (CLIMA), 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT), Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (ECHO, International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and the Foreign Policy 
Instrument (FPI). Additionally, information provided by other DGs may have been at best peripheral 
to the areas studied. The aim was to find sources that were first-hand as to make sure the analysis 
made from the information was not affected by other authors but provided from the facts found in 
these documents. In appropriate cases information from other institutions were used as well, such as 
the European Council and the European Parliament websites. But also independent institutions such as 
the World Trade Organisation. These were accessed to provide information on the workings of these 
organisations and the role held by the European Union within them. Many of these institution provide 
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a forum of multilateral negotiations, the representative of the European Union in these forums is 
required knowledge to find how the European Commission’s representative role has changed (if at all). 
In terms of comparison and facts regarding the European External Action Service most facts have been 
collected from the website of the EEAS and the documents found therein. Unlike the European 
Commission which is divided into the DGs, information about the EEAs activities are all readily 
available on the same website. As the EEAS is also the diplomatic service of the EU information have 
sometimes been compiled from the websites of the different diplomatic delegations to different 
countries in the world as most have their own separate websites. The research on these have mostly 
been superficial. The facts on these sites often focus on individual projects and contain unmanageable 
amounts of data. This method of data-gathering has thus mainly been used when dealing with large 
and especially important negotiation partners of the European Union, such as China and the US. 
For reasons of providing a sufficient theoretical background and strengthen the explaining force of 
theories used works of several scholars have been consulted in their construction such as Chafetz and 
Aggestam. To keep the analysis preliminarily original work these have not been taken out of works 
that dealt with the European Commission itself but rather to provide a general explanation of the 
theory. However, works from scholars of the European Commission and other institutions such as Hall, 
Taylor and Furness have been consulted to explain some of the central themes used in this paper.  
Considerations and Demarcation 
The divide into the policy areas Energy, Climate, ICT, Transport, Trade, Aid and development and 
Common security and defence policy may seem to be an arbitrary one. As such a sufficient 
explanation to the choices is required. The policy divides have been made to simplify the selection 
process of material. All of these areas are represented by European Union Directorate-Generals. As 
such when considering the division of power between the EEAs and the EC there is little need to 
consider the divisions within the EC as well as they are clearly divided into these DGs. This makes a 
study of institutional overlap slightly clearer. 
It needs to be mentioned that the research has been done almost completely on basis of these websites 
and various documents of EU origin. The issue of bias therefore needs to be considered. Research has 
been focused on simple facts and avoided issues that may be a form of opinion. This is to make sure 
analysis is done with separation to the object of study. Nevertheless, all forms of bias cannot be 
avoided. 
The DGs were chosen based on three factors:  
One is the division based on similar topics. A study on the DG CLIMA and policy area of climate 
should be sufficient to cover the issues of environment related overlaps without also having to cover 
DG ENV. Similarly many of the policy areas affected by DG TAXUD (Taxation and Customs Union) 
area already covered in an analysis of the DG trade. In most cases these DGs overlap enough that even 
their structure is largely the same. The distinctions made by DGs would also be difficult to compare to 
the broader EEAS if they were to be made. 
Secondly, the requirement of the DGs to provide a wide variety of different roles that the EC and the 
EEAS might take. This is needed to create the role-set which is constructed by this piece of research. 
An addition of DG MARE for example may have been redundant due to the similarities of roles 
carried out in DG MOVE in many a sense. Of course, one might argue that the weighing becomes 
skewed due to this specific selection but the paper compares different ways mandate has been retained, 
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while the assertion is that the EC has managed to retain most of its mandate in external affairs an 
essay-length discussion on this assertion does not add to the research at hand.  
Thirdly, the selection required the policy area to have an important external dimension. The treaty 
change only affected representation with third-party countries and as such changes within the union 
are not discussed in this paper. Each of the areas have been analysed based on their relations to these 
third parties. While the union may partake in many important projects within the union in a specific 
policy area it is not to be equalled to the role it might take externally. It could be argued that almost all 
of the Union’s activities have some sort of external dimension or effect, for example while the DG 
SANTE’s regulations on food safety might affect the TTIP treaty negotiations, the DGs policy area 
requires a more specific external dimension than this. 
Lastly, one item that must be addressed is the issue of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). One 
might say that the CAP is the single one policy that affects the external dimension of the EU to the 
greatest effect. Not choosing to study DG AGRI might as such be seen as massively overlooking 
important issues. Certainly, while the effects of the CAP are significant, especially discussing issues 
such as food dumping and similar trade practices along with the significant budget of the CAP is 
essential it falls outside of the scope of this essay. This is partly because the topic is wide enough to 
require its own research paper but also because the retaining over mandate on trade by the EC has left 
the issue mostly unchanged and the interest in agriculture of the HR and the EEAS has been rather 
tame. Going as far as not to mention it in public documents. It might be desired to keep it in mind 
around discussions on the external level, however. 
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Theory 
Historical Institutionalism: Inertia in institutional authority 
To make the assertion that the European Commission has lost little power after the treaty changes of 
Lisbon is a controversial claim. It requires basis in both theory and fact to do. We often view the 
Union as a whole as an ongoing process with no pre-set goal. In this we see the process as one of 
integration, further pooling of the powers of the government of the Member States and more mandate 
and policies being pursued at the European level. As such, the European Commission, being given 
more power to act abroad in external relations is one such process one would assume to continue in the 
same direction, with more mandate given to the Commission. The process at large, but also in the 
smaller scale regarding the Commission is part of ‘path dependence’; a process to which the Member 
States have little control (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 937). This idea of historical institutionalism is 
applied to the Commission as an institution which have been following this path for a very long time 
has become part of a ‘routine’. On the European Level individuals serve as actors in relating to 
representing their Member State. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939) Large decisions (such as treaty 
revision) and small ones (deciding to take measures to investigate a course of action) are de facto 
decided by either heads of governments or their ministers. Especially in terms of external action where 
the main part of mandate lie within the Foreign Affairs Council.  
Viewing the EC’s ideas through historical institutionalism provides a starting point which fits very 
well with the commission as a whole due to institutionalist understanding of the evolution of 
institutions. They profess that they have certain ideas and goals in mind when structuring policies 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Which is certainly true for the European Commission especially in the 
policy area of trade which also penetrates most areas in European External relations especially in those 
policy areas that relate to economy. 
The central theme on these international relations is as always power. In this case complicated by the 
fact that some sovereignty has been pooled in the EU institutions. Individuals will seek to maximize 
their benefits from the arrangement. The best way to do so is to use the instruments at hand (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 939). The largest of which available is the European Commission which acts as in 
different roles such as agreement broker, enforcer, and node of information. The information kept by 
the Commission is necessary for the actor to act rationally and strategically. Actors turn to the 
Commission as not doing so would leave the individual less off than his adversaries (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 440). The Commission resolves issues; especially those around coordination. The EU, in 
External Relations, has an abundance of such issues. The more the Commission is successful in 
resolving these issues the stronger and more robust of an institution it becomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p. 941). The Commission, compared to the EEAS which is a contender as a representative of the 
Union abroad has existed for a long time and been involved in many coordination disputes. It is far 
more likely that the FAC calls on the Commission to act as dispute resolver and expert advice. As an 
interesting side-note on this it is noted that the High Representative of Foreign Affairs at current time 
is far more influential than the institution she holds. This can be explained by the fact that the HR was 
an effect of the Amsterdam treaty and has such existed longer than the EEAS (European External 
Action Service, 2015w). The effect of this is that the position of HR has become far more robust over 
the years as it worked to coordinate external relations of the EU.  
The inefficiency generated by this pattern of behaviour is the general inertia within EU institutions. 
The fact that The EC has been able to retain much of its power is just one effect of this. The EEAS is 
imagined as a more effective and purposive institution but the ‘policy legacy’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 
941) of external relations lie in the EC. The inertia is, however, prevalent even within EU domestic 
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policies. Yet, the question of how it has retained its power, and in what the Lisbon Treaty actually 
changed remains. 
To certain point the treaty itself could be viewed as a ‘critical juncture’. A situation or a decision 
important enough to create a punctuation or branching point where the path that the dependency 
follows changes (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). These are most of the time new decisions made that 
changes institutions in such a way that the path must turn. The Lisbon treaty can be viewed as an 
attempt to make this happen. It warrants a discussion on why this was seen as necessary as most 
historical institutionalists stress military conflict or economic crisis as the most common factors that 
decide when junctures are reached (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942) this does not seem to be the case here. 
Although the world was in a time of economic distress it probably had little effect on the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
It needs to be expressed that the Commission itself fought the changes. Some officials rather saw the 
DG RELEX, which now no longer exists, should be empowered and that the new institution was not 
needed (Furness, 2011, p. 4). The Commission, as well as the Member States, have also taken 
significant steps to guard against the EEAS’ supposed autonomy (Furness, 2011, p. 5). The current 
situation of retained power within the EC can thus be explained first by the unwillingness of the 
Member States to give the EEAS a clear autonomous mandate, as demonstrated by the safeguards. 
Second by the Commission having an agenda of fighting the changes. As can be seen by Barroso’s 
Commission ensuring that the HR works closely with other commissioners so that coordination would 
require commission participation. The Commission also made sure to have strong control over which 
areas were transferred to the EEAS and secured that commission official staff that was transferred 
were given important positions in the new institution (Furness, 2011, p. 14). The larger more 
functional EC now has many areas that overlap with the EEAS. One that stands out is the DG FPI 
(Foreign Policy Instrument) which makes sure that the operation budget of the EEAS is controlled by 
the Commission (Furness, 2011, p. 14). Third, paradoxically, the hypothesis that the EEAS was 
created to limit the Commission’s power. As discussed previously it is in the individual’s interest to 
maximize its benefits from the arrangement of pooling resources (Furness, 2011, p. 8). This means 
securing more benefits from its adversaries in the EU, the Commission, holding an agenda was 
eventually seen as too powerful and thus became another adversary to overcome in reaping the 
benefits of pooling resources. New policy areas and greater involvement in the world at large, as well 
as increased military activity abroad (European External Action Service, 2015u) has thus not echoed 
by an increased power of the Commission but rather a stronger focus on power retention by the 
Commission. 
The result is that the critical juncture did not occur as one would expect from the change of 
institutional set-up, instead the policy area mandates and initiatives are far more ‘liquid’ than they 
used to be changing between the EEAS and the Commission which are holding a form of institutional 
‘turf war’ (Furness, 2011, p. 14) all the while the Member States and the European Parliament are also 
involved in the process. A closer look at the policies in question is well warranted and will be 
discussed as well as a more in-depth discussion about institutional overlap. 
Institutional Overlap 
If we know that there is a great deal of institutional overlap regarding the EEAS and EC ‘turf war’ 
confirming the assertion made by the research questions requires a look at how that overlap affects the 
ability to project power in external relations. 
Simon	Axbrink	Jönsson	 	 STVM23	
Department	of	Political	Science	 	 Tutor:	Magnus	Jerneck	
12	
Institutional Overlap consists of three dimensions. The degree and form of overlap depends on the 
how they vary between these dimension. First is membership which often matters little in this context 
as the membership is the same for both institutions with the absence of qualified majority voting in 
external relations (Hofmann, 2011, p. 103). The second is mandate. Sources of retention for the EC 
within mandate does not only lie in the functions set out to it by the treaties which would be assumed, 
but also in the ambiguity of the EEAS’ mandate itself. The fact that the EEAS’ mandate is not clearly 
defined but still subject to limitations makes the mandate of the EC in this area vary depending on the 
EEAS’ granted functions and areas of limitations (Hofmann, 2011, pp. 103-104). Where the EEAS 
cannot act the Commission normally can. In broad strokes we see the Commission as leading in trade, 
budgetary in security and prominent in multilateral action due to the EEAS being leading in bilateral 
actions, operational in security and regulatory in trade. The third one is resources. Resources is where 
the EC outshines the EEAS due to its vast access to expertise and information. In external actions the 
Commission serves as the main repository for information that constructs action (Hofmann, 2011, p. 
104). The FAC also relies on the Commission when it comes to making decisions within policies. If 
the EC has been legally relieved of some influence in External Relations it is in resources we will find 
powerful sources of ability for retention. 
As a whole it is important to note that institutional overlap must not be an inhibiting force to member 
states or the EU. In fact actors and member states involved in the policy-making process may benefit 
from a great deal of institutional overlap as it allows the state or the actor the choice of two different 
ways to affect policy and may choose the one that is most suitable for its preferences (Hofmann, 2011, 
p. 105). As such the interaction of member states with the institutions will affect the legitimacy of an 
institution’s claim of a policy area. The perceived ability of the institution to reach the state’s 
preferences affects the degree to which the state is likely to prefer its involvement in a policy area. 
There is a clear tendency of the FAC to trust the Commission to carry out missions regarding 
information gathering. Through the strategic documents it is clear that the FAC consider the European 
Commission a full member of the CFSP being qualified by its capacity for expertise. 
Toward a theory to analyse the European Commission 
From historical institutionalism we may see that institutions often have a tendency of retention due to 
institutional inertia caused by a behavioural pattern affected by path dependency of the Member states 
to relate to the European Commission in times of need of the FAC (policy legacy). The European 
Commission is thus expected to hold agency and fight to keep their power in external relations. The 
path dependency is also strong due to the lack of a sufficient crisis to nurture the need for a change in 
External Relations and the mandate supposed to be held by a new institution in an already highly 
institutionalized area was not sufficiently clarified by the treaty change. The result being a change in 
mandate which may have a diminished effect due to the EC’s ability to use other forms of power and 
taking on alternative roles to counteract the changes.  
Institutional overlap shows us that the access to expertise has now most likely become the most 
important resource to the European Commission. As such we can draw the conclusion that the roles 
that the European Commission fulfils have changed and is thus the most prominent effect of the treaty 
change. As such to see why the European Commission has remained a major player in the European 
Union’s external relations we need to look at the new roles of the European Commission through a 
perspective of roles in the policy areas relating to external action as well as explaining the mandates 
through a comparative discussion with the EEAS.  
Simon	Axbrink	Jönsson	 	 STVM23	
Department	of	Political	Science	 	 Tutor:	Magnus	Jerneck	
13	
Role Theory and its application to the European Commission 
The European Commission plays a plethora of different roles in EU external relations. Using a theme 
of roles it is perhaps natural when analyzing the actual territory of the EC in External Affairs. By 
using Role-Theory as an analytical tool it is easier to interpret the conduct of the EC in European 
world affairs. In this area referring to the European Commission in the world as carrying out not one 
function or agenda but as having several roles, in this case divided by different policy areas. Policies, 
here, will be what Glenn Chafetz discusses to be ‘situations’ in his use of Role-Theory (1997, p. 664). 
The approach is further made valid by the fact that the European Commission is far from the only 
actor within the European Union institutional fora who acts for the Union in external relations. Since 
this discussion is bound to be one of institutional and interior power as much as one of external 
mandate and capacity it is also required to use a theory that favours domestic sources of policy (Beneš, 
2011). This leaves room for some eccentricities that are either non-existent or much more subtle in 
nation-state foreign policy. In analyzing the European commission role it is important to pay attention 
to the two dimensions of power it possesses. In the ways it has direct power in form of a mandate or 
delegated power but also in the indirect way where it has power through its capacity for expertise and 
ability to create or investigate policy approaches, which is often allowed by the Foreign Affairs 
Council although it is outside of the treaty-based competences. While the dimensions are not mutually 
exclusive it goes without saying that the lack of the ‘upper’ dimension of power in some policy areas 
the EC does not qualify for some of the roles within the theory. The fact that it does not have the same 
mandate in all policies increases the array of roles it may fill. 
Thus; using Foreign Policy Analysis like Role-Theory rather than International Relations theory, 
which would be more applicable when analyzing the European Union as an international institution 
serves a specific reason in this paper. Emphasis lie on the EU and the EC in specific as a Foreign 
Policy actor. A focused look on the policies that the Commission pursue in the EUs foreign policy is 
much better at finding the roles that the Commission fulfill.  
More common approaches also has the weakness of seeing actors on the international level either 
having to be nation-states and/or see them as entirely unitary actors. This is a weakness of many forms 
of IR theory and makes them incompatible in an approach where you see the Union as a force to be 
reckoned with in the International system. While Ziêba remarks the European Union can be analysed 
as serving the role of a sovereign actor in international politics (Ziêba, 2012, p. 63); most IR 
approaches are focused on the three levels of analysis where the European Union stands out as an 
exception, especially as an actor in the world; as it falls between the cracks. The idea is also not to 
look at the EU as a whole but to focus on one of its institutions. IR theory is ill equipped for this 
purpose. 
Lisbeth Aggestam argues that it is best to discuss Role Theory from the perspective of four concepts: 
‘Role Expectation’ as to what is expected of the Actor (Aggestam, 2006, p. 18). One would assume 
that the role expectation here is the functions set out in the treaty, however, this is far from the truth. 
The EC is given a great deal of mandate in the European Foreign Policy by the Council still. A more 
complex, but accurate approach would be to look at the External Action Service and the High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs as compared to the commission. The EEAS is not equipped to 
handle all aspects of foreign affairs, as will be seen. This leaves room for the Commission which has 
performed strongly before, to pick up the mandate that the EEAS cannot (yet) carry. A look at the 
functions of the EEAS in a comparative analysis would thus show where the EC’s range of tasks lie. 
‘Role Conception’ refers to the expectations the EC holds toward itself (Aggestam, 2006, p. 19). EC 
policy goals are easy to find. The Commission frequently produces strategic papers and report to the 
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Council its activities in the relevant policy area. Actions also require approval from the Council thus 
prompting the EC to produce a great deal of material on why an action should be taken and the EC’s 
expectation on how to carry out the task at hand. 
‘Role performance’ to how well the EC manages to carry out its conceptions (Aggestam, 2006, p. 20). 
This concept justifies a multi-faceted approach. The EC varies widely in its performance based on the 
mandate it is given in the specific area. As such the performance itself is very much based on the 
freedom it is given to act; in some policies it has exclusive power, such as trade, while it fills only the 
role of expert advice in others. 
Finally ‘role-set’ which defines the different roles the EC takes and has the capacity to perform in the 
international arena (Aggestam, 2006, p. 21). Found by the combination of the other concepts. By 
constructing an accurate role-set we will see why the EC has retained its power so well in external 
relations. 
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Analysis 
Comparative Analysis: The EEAS in Foreign Affairs 
The FPI: The Go-between 
While the EAS has direct authority over the CFSP and the CSDP of the EU since the change brought 
in by the Lisbon Treaty commission power still exists to some degree. The DG FPI (foreign policy 
instrument) works in tandem with the EAS. Unlike other DGs the FPI operates under the authority of 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Federica Mogherini) (Directorate-General, FPI, 2015e). 
This relationship is unique among the DGs and makes the FPI a half-half between the commission and 
the EAS. Where Mogherini has authority over them but requires approval from the college of 
commissioners to use it (European External Action Service, 2015b). It is important to note that the HR 
is already a vice-president of the commission and is responsible for coordinating the work of many of 
the commissioners of the areas previously discussed. She does not, however, have the same authority 
over their areas as the she does over the FPI. 
Discussing the FPI requires a close look at the context in which it was created and exists today. Unlike 
other DGs one cannot discuss a process of ‘handing over’ power to the EAS as the FPI was created 
with the Lisbon Treaty much like the EAS itself. The scope of the FPI is as such set from the 
beginning and its authority is static as opposed to the DGs which have (formally) lost some external 
authority. Regardless, the FPI much like EAS but even more so was created to fill a function which 
was not as prevalent before. As the main function of the FPI is to oversee operations and financing for 
external missions an entire DG would not have been required before these mission became common 
enough to justify it (Directorate-General, FPI, 2015e) Instead the Directorate General RELEX which 
was succeeded by the EEAS carried out both functions. Simply put as the EU became more invested in 
external actions a new instrument was required to oversee them.  
With this in mind it should be noted that the FPI operates according to the EAS’ and FAC (Foreign 
Affairs Council’s) policy goals and does not pursue them on a political level themselves. Their goals 
would rather be set out on the targets of their actions abroad be they civil or military. Therefore their 
actions are likely to be quick, small-scope and numerous in order to reach the overarching targets of 
the EAS (Directorate-General, FPI, 2015e). This is outside the scope of this research. 
What must be mentioned, however, is the function it serves in tying the EAS to the rest of the EC itself. 
This relates to broad-scope action relating to several actors such as the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP combines long-term and short-term actions for crisis response 
and stability building. In this case the FPI mobilizes services of the EC and the EAS to meet the needs 
of the situation (Directorate-General, FPI, 2015b). As development and aid are EC functions but the 
Common Defense and Security Policy is an EAS function close cooperation is required (European 
External Action Service, 2015b). The IcSP is far from the only instance where this is true, however. 
Election observation, while decided upon by the EAS are headed by a select member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) (Directorate-General, FPI, 2015a). More areas are sanction-related actions 
(Directorate-General, FPI, 2015c) and cooperation with EU partnership countries (Directorate-General, 
FPI, 2015d). 
The FPI could be seen as the evidence that the division of Foreign Affairs issues made by the EU at 
present is not always equipped to handle the situation. With the EAS being is charge of some areas 
and the EC of others the FPI works as a go-between in areas where none of these institutions solely 
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can take the lead or have the competencies to handle the situation in a satisfactory manner. What 
shows this further is that even when the EAS is not involved the instrument sometimes works as the 
go-between of other EU institutions concerning external operations as well. 
Commission vs. EEAS influence a matter of negotiation structure or policy area? 
The EEAS first and foremost profiles itself as the EU’s diplomatic service. This means that in practice 
the EEAS carries out all bilateral negotiations. A difference in form of negotiation and action rather 
than a difference in policy is therefore also important in seeing the full scope of how Foreign Affairs 
are carried out by the EU. Many agreements, as will be seen, in some policy areas have been 
negotiated bilaterally via a delegation in the partner’s capital. In the areas in which this has been done, 
the EC can be seen to have diminished in power severely in the recent years. Transport is an example 
of this. Bilateral negotiations and delegations are no longer controlled by the EC since the removal of 
DG RELEX and all such negotiations are thus on the table of the EEAS (European Commission, 2010, 
p. 1).  
The EEAS superiority in bilateral negotiations in relation to the EC comes from the EU delegations. 
With 139 of them in total the EEAS runs relations with any country in which there is no strong formal 
connection to (European External Action Service, 2015d). There are some policy areas in which the 
EC has seen little actual progress within the last five years, sometimes as much as a decade with no 
change in relation between the EC and the target country. In most, if not all cases, this is due to the EC 
losing their bilateral competence. This certainly presents a picture of a foreign affairs institution more 
limited by its form than by specific policy areas. To find if this is the case; a thorough comparative 
analysis of the EEAS competences in the policy areas needs to be carried out. While the EEAS does 
not possess the same form of DG structure as the EC the DGs make the distinction of policy areas 
required not to make the selection of areas arbitrary.  
Energy in the EEAS 
The EU seeks coherence in Energy trade approaches toward the rest of the world. The EC is not 
getting directly involved in affairs concerning the actual trade, but negotiates on peripherals. The 
EEAS similarly works with coherence but focuses on the importance of Energy security. Due to trade 
of this kind being the area of the EC, and the European council asking the EC to produce the European 
Energy security strategy the EEAS is decisively pushed to the sidelines despite having the authority in 
security within the institutional structure of the EU (European External Action Service, 2015a). One of 
the reasons for this is that Russia supplies the EU with nearly 40% of its gas (Directorate-General, 
ENER, 2015c). Due to the Ukrainian situation, negotiations with Russia has not only soured but been 
brought enough to the frontlines that bilateral negotiations with Russia has been handed over to higher 
authority than the civil servants of the EEAS. Frederica Mogherini is involved but so are many of the 
European Council members and thereby MS heads of states (The Guardian, 2015). Nevertheless the 
EEAS is responsible for implementing sanctions against Russia and is therefore indirectly involved 
(Directorate-General, FPI, 2015c). Furthermore energy trade is not carried out bilaterally by the EU as 
a whole but rather bilaterally between the MS themselves (European Commission, 2011). When talks 
with the EU is done it is mostly done in international organizations in a multilateral manner. In many 
cases this means it is a commission concern as is demonstrated by VP of the Commission Maroš 
Šefčovič’s presence in Ukraine and hosting the trilateral Ukraine-Russia-EU meeting on gas (Directorate-General, ENER, 
2015b) (Directorate-General, ENER, 2015a). Lastly it is the responsibility of the EC to oversee the bilateral 
agreements between countries on energy trade (Directorate-General, ENER, 2015d). Suffice to say the 
EEAS authority is at the moment rather limited in the policy area of Energy. 
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Climate change: Green diplomacy 
If the EEAS is limited in the Energy arena due to the power of MS bilateral agreements it is the 
limited by the opposite in the Climate debate. Despite this also being a security threat the EEAS has 
been very much inactive in the climate area. Due to its nature, it is an issue that must be pursued on 
the multilateral level. The EC has thus been the most active party as demonstrated by the VP of the 
Commission Maroš Šefčovič being present at the UN climate summits representing the union (Directorate-General, 
CLIMA, 2015) and roundtable events being organised by the commission with e.g. Africa. 
(Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014d). Nevertheless, it would be misleading to say that the EEAS is 
entirely inert in this matter. 
The EEAS as seen through a contemporary viewpoint is taking areas previously controlled by the 
Commission to a much greater extent than before. What we see could be considered a slow process of 
handing over the policy area. As we see, the roundtable on Climate action with Africa was hosted by 
the commission but the later roundtable with Asia and the pacific region was a co-hosted event with 
the EEAS (Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014d). Similarly with the G-20 meeting in 2014 Rompuy 
was present to drive Climate change as one of his main points (van Rompuy, 2014). Despite this in 
2015 at the G-7 meeting in Lübeck Mogherini is the present representative. Climate change was one of 
the primary security concerns discussed at the meeting (G7 Foreign Ministers, 2015). One interesting 
point might be the European strategy on environmental integration in external relations. This 
legislation aims to integrate the environmental aspect in all areas of external affairs. With bilateral 
relations being an area of the EEAS this would mean that the EEAS is required to bring up the point in 
any negotiation through their diplomatic service. Though negotiations are often non-transparent and 
their results rarely report progress in the area of sustainable development it is feasible that the EEAS 
has a greater stake in environmental and climate policies than what can otherwise be anticipated 
(European Commission, 2005). 
Yet; goals and ambitions towards battling climate change is still the ECs responsibility nearing the 
2015 Paris protocol on climate change. A necessity due to many of the environment goals has been set 
out years before the EEAS was established (Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014d). This would have to 
be considered some expertise and legislative ‘stickiness’ working to keep competences for 
environment in the EC. In conclusion EEAS green diplomacy must be, at best, seen in terms of a work 
in progress. At worst it is very much an issue for the European Commission still. 
Trade 
Unlike the area of climate and energy the disparity between responsibilities of the EC and the EEAS 
are much clearer in the trade policy area. Trade is firmly an area in which the EC is taking a leading 
role and the EEAS do not discuss trade deals in e.g. the WTO. One of the reasons for this is of course 
the position of the Commission in this area. Being the exclusive policy-maker in external trade matters 
the EEAS has no position in negotiations or discussing/concluding international agreements 
(Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014d). However, there are a few areas of trade which the EEAS are 
indirectly involved with due to their nature relating to security of the Union. Most notably these are 
sanctions and arms exports and proliferation (European External Action Service, 2015g). 
Sanctions are under the control of the EEAS due it to it being considered a part of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The sanctions are implemented by FAC’s (Foreign Affairs Council) 
approval but are essentially an EEAS and FPI tool superseding trade policies and free trade measures 
in place (European External Action Service, 2015g). These place restrictions upon 31 countries in 
regards to trade as well as restrictions upon individuals and organizations thought to be providing 
various types of aid to terrorist groups (European Council, 2014, pp. 2-3). Discussions about these 
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restrictions and politics surrounding them are then also the responsibility of the EEAS and the FPI 
(European External Action Service, 2015g). 
In the area of arms trade it is the aim of the EEAS to make sure that all such trades and exports are 
restricted and comply with the code of conduct on arms export. These products are subject to 
restrictions not commonly in place in EU trade (Council of the European Union, 1998). As such it is 
their right to refuse the right of export for MS based on criterions set out in the code of conduct. The 
EEAS may also call on international agreements on arms trade to make denials toward arms trade and 
exports (European External Action Service, 2015e). The Commission is not negotiating in trade 
relating to arms exports. And the EEAS is the negotiating partner in the UN when the Arms Trade 
Treaty is being discussed (European External Action Service, 2015f). 
ICT and Communication 
Unlike the other areas discussed formerly the EEAS has more than a peripheral involvement in ICT 
and communication regulations. The EEAS is together with the commission the originator of the EU 
Cyber Security Strategy, EU position on priorities for the EU’s international cyberspace policy 
(European External Action Service, 2013). The EEAS in direct matters is through the European 
Defence Agency responsible for the EU cyber defense. This includes training and exercises for cyber 
defense personnel. (European External Action Service, 2013) 
The EEAS is an initiator within the area and the council takes decisions based on the proposals by the 
HR regarding the issue. The EEAS is developing the ‘EU Cyber and Defence Policy Framework’ and 
is such deciding on the defense priorities in this area (European External Action Service, 2013). The 
topic having being previously discussed it comes as no surprise that negotiations are heavily 
influenced by the EEAS as the diplomatic service is involved in many negotiations with partners in a 
bilateral fashion. This makes the EEAS far more influential in this policy area than in others although 
form is not the only reason for this. This responsibility and the delegations themselves are causing 
considerable spill-over due to the broad spectrum of ICT in general. The European Delegation to 
China can be seen as a good example of this. The EEAS is now involved in research, ICT industry, 
personal data protection and infrastructure development apart from its original activities (Delegation 
of the European Union to China, 2015). 
Having first developed the ‘Cyber Security Strategy’ in 2013 the EEAs has enveloped the area of the 
internet and now claims to cover justice and home affairs, the internal market and foreign policy issue 
with the policy frameworks that exist. For the foreign policy apparatus to take care of home affairs is a 
considerable step forwards for its influence (European External Action Service, 2015o). Indirectly the 
policy document wishes to strengthen EU market by ensuring safe and trustworthy business online as 
well as pursue EU foreign policy goals as spreading European values through securing access to a free 
an open internet abroad for nationals in third party countries (European External Action Service, 
2015o). Safe to say ICT is a key area for the EEAS, being a policy area that has recently expanded 
rapidly may be one of the reasons why the EEAS has had an easier time of gaining control over this 
policy area. 
Aid and Development 
Aid and development is an area of considerable policy overlap which is accentuated by the fact that 
the Commission and the EEAS has a closer collaboration and a rather artificial split in the area. The 
EEAS being responsible for the short and medium term operations. These include the civilian aspects 
of policing, ensuring the rule of law, assisting with expertise and administration as well as help 
workers to aid in case of natural disasters (European External Action Service, 2015l). The EEAS also 
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carries out military missions these include both missions of training local forces but also joint action 
military operations to promote stability (European External Action Service, 2015u). The range is 
wider, however, the special representatives previously discussed are key players in mediation and 
political facilitation (European External Action Service, 2015m). Their task is to build confidence and 
foster dialogue in the area of military or civilian personnel abroad the EEAS holds most of the 
jurisdiction and is the most prominent actor in the field. 
In the long-term the European Aid programs are mostly controlled by the EC which provides FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment) and holds most of the money but the EEAS is still involved to make the 
transition more tangible. The EEAS is responsible to assess the effectiveness of EuropeAid and 
spreads good practices through its expertise (European External Action Service, 2015n). It is also 
responsible for deciding on the synergy which means it essentially decides when the area is ready for 
more long-term plans (European External Action Service, 2015s). An area which is possible promoted 
in equal measure by both parties is the respect of human rights as it is by the treaties considered to be 
‘mainstreamed’; carried out in all areas of European external affairs; even trade (European External 
Action Service, 2015q). The EEAS’ bilateral relations are heavily influenced by this but similarly so 
are multilateral EC relations. The central principles of European external activities are the same as 
those of the EEAS, democracy and the rule of law; abolishing the death penalty, combating torture and 
fighting racism and other forms of discrimination (European External Action Service, 2015v). 
In more concrete terms in mediation the EU holds ‘facilitated dialogues’ special mediation session that 
focus on specific areas. These have normally been approved by the UN such as the ones in the middle-
eastern peace process and the normalisation talks between Kosovo and Serbia (European External 
Action Service, 2015r) (European External Action Service, 2015p). 
Aid and Development and the discussion of the EEAS and the EC contribution comes down to a 
difference of action and finance. Where the EEAS carries out most action abroad as well as coordinate 
military and civilian EU operations the EC oversees almost all of the financing not only for the 
operations but also for Aid payments abroad and the EU is the largest aid donor in the world today 
(European External Action Service, 2015n). 
Transport 
In the case study analysis of the EC influence in the transport area it was concluded that power might 
have been lost to the EEAS. This assumption made due to the activities in the transport area in 
bilateral negotiations by the EC with partners such as India, China and Russia dropping and little if 
anything happening after 2006. The argument is problematic, the EEAS was not set up until much 
later. In this context it must be taken into account that development took many years to complete 
already before the stop in 2006 (European Commission and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian 
Federation, 2005) (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012c) (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012e). 
In relation to China; transport discussions are not reestablished since. The EEAS has had no greater 
success in establishing greater coordination in aviation or water traffic. However, China has no direct 
borders toward the EU and the EEAS has therefore strived to connect land routes to China through the 
Central Asia strategy put up by the EC in 2007. This particularly relates to cooperation with 
Kazakhstan in connecting the TEN-T network to western China (Commission of the European 
Communities and the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
2009). As with India due to large geographical distances; the focus of negotiations have been on 
internet and E-services besides Maritime security (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012h). 
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Connections with Russia have been different however, with cooperation going on until the break in 
communication in 2014. The EEAS mainly negotiates with Russia on transport through the EU-Russia 
transport dialogue. It has removed some border congestion and improved interoperability of rail 
transport. As well as removing the Siberian Overflight Charges System. The EEAS has competently 
both taken over negotiations in transport with Russia and strengthened overlooking recent 
developments in Ukraine (European External Action Service, 2015x). 
Despite this most negotiation on transport are now carried out through multilateral frameworks such as 
the ENP and the EU-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED Transport Project, 2014) (Directorate-
General, MOVE, 2015). As such it can be seen that the EEAS is not looking at transport as a 
prioritized area. Excluding the fight against piracy and maritime security where the EEAS has a stake 
with both military and civilian operations abroad (European External Action Service, 2015y). The 
EEAS is heavily invested especially in Somalia and has full ownership of these operations (European 
External Action Service, 2015y). In the field of transport the EEAS has full control over the security 
aspect. 
CSDP and CFSP 
Much of the capacity of the EEAS in CDSP and CFSP comes down to the post of the High 
Representative of Foreign Policy. While the EEAS itself does not exert much influence on other 
institutions the HR does in many ways. She is not only the head of the EEAS but also of the European 
Defense Agency which facilitates defense cooperation among the member states and promotes 
development of better armaments (European External Action Service, 2015h). 
Furthermore she chairs the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) which supports the 
elaboration and projection of the EU’s foreign policy and further develops the CSDP and CFSP. The 
institute analyses foreign, security and defense policy issues relevant to formulating the foreign policy 
and promote discussion around it as well as facilitating expert and decision-makers to meet and 
discuss (European External Action Service, 2015i). 
She decides the operational direction of SatCen which is the EU institution which provides 
intelligence data from the European observation satellites and is the primary institution governing the 
EU CFSP/CSDP for development and cooperation in the space security domain (European External 
Action Service, 2015j). These are the primary examples of the HR’s capabilities outside of the EEAS 
itself which competences have been elaborated upon previously. Excluding of course, her vice 
presidency of the commission and her ability to chair the Foreign Affairs Council and sit in on 
European Council meetings. This all goes well in line with her objective to bring all EU assets 
together for a coordinated approach to a common foreign and security policy (European External 
Action Service, 2015k). She also coordinates all commissioners with external relations portfolios. 
It is important to note that the role of HR was implemented a decade before the EEAS and therefore 
has been instrumental in the construction of the EEAS itself.  
 
Multiple Case Study: The European Commission’s Roles in Foreign Affairs 
Energy: The Facilitator 
A good starting point when addressing the research question in terms of the energy policy area is to 
establish in legal documents where competences lie and what may be pursued in these competences. In 
this policy area the ability to trade energy is the main external component while other areas are more 
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domestic. Since the EU holds a supranational position inside the EU negotiations on a global and 
external level are where research is best suited to examine where the EC authority lies in its foreign 
policy. By September 2011 EU energy policy and bilateral agreements were incoherent and only the 
area of the member states, the EU being on the side-lines. There was no transparency in the 
agreements between member states and third party countries toward the EU and was thus a completely 
intergovernmental concern (European Commission, 2011). The EU’s role was passive in this field at 
this time and was of little demand; it could carry out no function of use to the member states. However, 
since the 7th of September 2011 the Commission has followed a strategy to change how relations to 
third countries are carried out in the energy market. The result was a ‘Communication on Security of 
Energy Supply and International Cooperation’ in November the same year. It should be noted that it 
was a response to Member State requests to create a coherent strategy in this area as it was based on a 
conclusion from the council as early as February 2011 (European Commission, 2011).  
The communication led to the legislated decision on an information exchange mechanism on 
intergovernmental agreements in the field of energy with third countries in which all IGAs 
(intergovernmental agreements) are voluntarily submitted to the Commission which makes it available 
to all other member states (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 13). 
This has led to increased coherence in EU external energy policies to the point where it has been 
possible for the Union to take action as a single actor. Specifically in relations to the US (European 
Commission, 2013) LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) exports. A single European external energy policy is 
not the aim of the Commission strategy as of yet but the new communication has led to a shift in 
negotiation locations from the national parliaments to the energy council as a direct effect of the 
transparency on bilateral agreement. The Commission is now also responsible for assessing how 
coherence has improved on the external level (European Commission, 2013). The commission 
suggests that the EU does play a prominent role in organisations of relevance in global energy politics 
such as the G8/G20, International Energy Forum, Clean Energy Ministerial and the International 
Platform for Energy Efficiency Cooperation. The Commission does stress that they only have an effect 
in informal meetings however, and has no formal instance (European Commission, 2013). 
In actual negotiations the EC does not discuss or aim to replace bilateral agreements between Member 
States and third-party countries. Instead the EU aims to deepen cooperation with third party states 
through other means of treaties and negotiations. This manifests through different types of agreements 
such as enlargement of the Energy Community to include more states in the European Neighbourhood 
Area and agreements on construction of pipelines and various economic advice in terms of enhanced 
energy infrastructure for interlinking with the European market for energy (European Commission, 
2013). The Commission sees itself as complementing the bilateral agreements rather than 
overshadowing or replacing them. 
Since this communication has come into effect the EC fills a new, previously non-existent role in this 
policy area. The EC does take a regulatory role by facilitating the deals between the trade partners in 
the field of energy. While in these negotiations the EU makes peripheral treaties that affect the energy 
area its most important role is likely the role as a judicial instance. The Commission analyses the IGAs 
and ensures that they are compatible with EU regulations. The Commission has so far been satisfied 
with the actions taken to mitigate any incompatibilities that have been identified (European 
Commission, 2013). The voluntary mechanisms and peripheral negotiation role keeps External Energy 
Relations to be out of the reach for the EC which in other areas of trade is often in a leading position.  
The circumstances of this agreement and the enhanced role the EC is taking can be seen as the Council 
(who decided on this arrangement in the first place) is attempting to make full use of Commission 
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expertise to the disfavour of EEAS structural relevance. The decision was taken two years after the 
decision to make the EEAS the institution to support the High Representative in representing the 
Union and the Commission is also responsible for deals in infrastructure to facilitate energy trade 
deals. The EC retaining its role as Union representative in this policy area and even further developing 
it is a mixture of the Council preferring the use of EC resources and the EC using its mandate in 
multilateral trade deals separate from EEAS deal competences. The EC has gained a new role as a 
facilitator of energy deals. 
Climate Change: The Negotiator 
Given that international treaties is the main component of climate issues it is by its structure different 
from energy policy area. Bilateral agreements are present here as well, but as they are mostly 
enveloped by emission trading systems between states the EU takes a different and somewhat more 
active role. The Directorate-General (CLIMA) itself overtly claims that its main role is that of leading 
international negotiations but it is also involved in the emissions trading system as it implements it 
(Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014c). One of the clearest examples of EU taking a more active role is 
its use of finance and aid through the commission to third party states, this aid is specifically aimed at 
developing climate related projects and goes by the definition of ‘climate finance’ (Directorate-
General, CLIMA, 2013, p. 4).  
Since 2005 a mandate to engage further with third party countries has been developed within the EU. 
For the EC itself this has meant creating a number of different bilateral agreements beside the 
agreements with regional groupings that have been established during roundtable conferences 
(Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014d). The EC has been consistently providing communications and 
information necessary for the Council to make decisions since 2005 pushing the Climate Agenda. This 
initially led to the previously mentioned spring 2005 decision by the council to establish a mandate to 
third party negotiations but also to contributions to every climate conference including the upcoming 
2015 Paris conference. These have contributed largely or fully to the EU platform going into these 
negotiations although they have not always been successful on the global scale (Directorate-General, 
CLIMA, 2014d). 
Contrary to the Energy Exchange Mechanism the Climate Actions specifically in relation to 2020 are 
not done on a voluntary basis but are the result of binding legislation (Directorate-General, CLIMA, 
2014b). While the targets were agreed by the Council it is also important to note that the targets were 
first planned by the Commission. While it is domestic (EU internal) in its nature it is a step in a 
process to export many of these goals to the global and external level in 2015 at the Paris climate 
conference. The Commission is certainly holding competences as it is delivering the proposal on what 
targets the EU should set in 2015. No agreement has been reached yet, however (Directorate-General, 
CLIMA, 2014a). Furthermore, also contrary to the Energy Exchange Mechanism, the monitoring 
mechanism for GHG (Green House Gases) emissions is mandatory and controlled by the Commission 
in cooperation with the European Environment Agency (European Union, 2004, p. 2). 
Regarding the negotiation role, the Commission has recently hosted a roundtable on climate change 
with the Asia-Pacific region. The roundtable represents a situation blurred lines between the 
Commission and the External Action Service (EAS) as it was a co-hosted event. In terms of 
attempting to establish a leading actor the roundtable was a direct follow-up of an earlier roundtable 
with the African Union which was hosted singularly by the commission (Directorate-General, 2012). 
It is reasonable to assume that the EAS was added as a host to be able to envelop further issues in the 
external policy arena. Similar negotiations have been carried out by the EC with the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Latin American and 
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Caribbean countries (LAC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
(Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014d). 
The EU and ECs interest in the climate may be noticed in wider global conferences as well. Both 
Herman van Rompuy and Jean-Claude Juncker are formal members of the G-20 group. As explained 
by Herman van Rompuy Jean-Claude Juncker has specifically stated that Climate was one of his main 
three issues to be discussed in the G-20 Meeting in Brisbane, along with the Ukraine Crisis and the 
global financial crisis. It is as such the only long-term question pushed by the commission president 
(van Rompuy, 2014, pp. 1-2). In specific the EC prudently pushes the question of applying the legally 
binding EC legislation due in 2030 that was agreed on by the council in October 2014 to the G20 as a 
whole (van Rompuy, 2014, p. 2). 
The EC is currently sticking to its negotiating role in the Climate area due to some legal stickiness in 
its mandate. The emission trading system was first implemented within the EU and its initial domestic 
nature made the Commission responsible for it. As the trading system went external they kept their 
implementation role in it. As always; their mandate to negotiate multilaterally makes them the chief 
negotiator in the multilateral climate talks. As such they are still chief representative in the area. It is 
not as clear as other areas, however, the EEAS has mandate in bilateral sustainability talks now and 
Mogherini has shown great interest in the climate area. As in other areas, time is a factor. The climate 
policy area is still in development, growing ever more important. The EEAS has been shown to make 
a grab for mandate and resources in developing areas as it is not affected by the EC’s ability to retain 
power. New roles are likely to fall to the EEAS easier than it is to transfer roles that the EC will try to 
retain. This idea can be best demonstrated by the HR’s failures to attend climate summits until the 
Paris conference where Mogherini stood with the presidents Juncker and Tusk (EEAS, 2015).  
Trade: The Leader 
Due to the Single Market policy Trade policy is the only policy in the EU in which the EU as a whole 
has exclusive power. This means the MS cannot alone decide on trade agreements and policies but 
needs to consult through the EU (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014d). As it is under the OLP 
(Ordinary Legislative Procedure) the framework also needs to be approved by the EP (European 
Parliament). As a whole EC power therefore lays mostly in the right of initiative (as is common in 
internal issues) (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014d). Furthermore the EC is responsible to negotiate 
trade agreements for the EU; although it needs to request permission from the council to do so. When 
the agreement is concluded it needs to be ratified by the council and approved by the EP (Directorate-
General, TRADE, 2014d). 
In actions directed outwards the EC monitors and assists regarding trade protection introduced by third 
party countries. It also pursues disciplinary actions to be taken against defending countries through the 
WTO courts (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014e). The Commission is also responsible to apply 
external WTO law on to the MS to prevent trade defense from the side of the EU itself. In this sense 
its legal authority is greater than that of the MS in the global arena. With the WTO it also has a chief 
negotiating position (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2013a).  
The Commission may engage in establishing trade defence rules if it can establish through a 
successful investigation that goods exported to the EU is subsidized by the exporting country. It is also 
capable to safeguard EU producers should prices change so rapidly that there is too little time to adapt 
to the new circumstances. The measures that the EC may take are strictly regulated (Directorate-
General, TRADE, 2014c, p. 1). In case of subsidies counter-measures the EC may after a ruling be 
apply them for a 6 month period. After a second investigation they may be made definitive up to a 
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maximum of 5 years. In case of safe-guards they may last for a maximum of 200 days or to a 
maximum definitive decision, 4 years (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014c, p. 1). Definitive 
measures regarding subsidies are subject to Council decision but may be implemented for a 9 month 
provisional period before the council takes a decision. In the case of safeguards the commission has 
full authority unless an MS wishes to refer to the council which may then overturn the commission 
ruling via a QMV-decision (qualitative majority vote) (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014c, p. 2). 
Finally, WTO negotiations are carried out by the EC. In order to get MS input they consult with the 
Trade Policy Committee. The goal is reconciliation between MS concerns and trade partner requests. 
This means that the details are discussed with the EP while complaints are handled with the council 
(Directorate-General, TRADE, 2013b, p. 1). As the EU counts as a custom’s union this effectively 
makes the EU commissioner for trade (Cecilia Malmström) the highest authority for trade of the 
largest economy in the world (while consultation for approval of negotiations still needs to be handed 
to the council and the EP) (Directorate-General, TRADE, 2014b). This is essentially because the trade 
Commissioner handles negotiations in the ministerial conferences which is the highest authority of the 
WTO (World Trade Organisation, 2013).  
Trade is a policy in lockdown by the EC. While the treaty states that the common commercial policy 
shall be made with the principles of the Union’s external action point 3 stipulates that the EC is 
representing the Union in trade deals and make the propositions for negotiations (European Union, 
2008). The mention in treaty text makes this policy area unique as mandate is expressly given to the 
EC for negotiation giving no concern to the EEAS which was created in the same treaty. Clearly this 
area has been most strongly retained by the EC already from the start. This area is solely retained by 
mandate and such form. 
ICT and Communications: The Enabler 
Unlike previously discussed areas, ICT and communications is different as it does not fit into the MS – 
EC competence divide. In internet governance, as well as internet infrastructure neither has a complete 
say over any part of the policy program. The internet cannot be governed on a national basis but 
neither is there a disconnect between Europe and other regions of the world (with some possible 
exceptions eg. China and other authoritarian states) (European Commission, 2014a). Simultaneously 
this is also an area where ideas of new policies are the most controversial. The EU idea of internet 
governance is very different from that of the United States for example. The commission thus pursues 
a policy of moving stewardship of the internet out of US hands to avoid large-scale surveillance of EU 
citizens which are in breach of the fundamental rights treaty (European Commission, 2014b, p. 1).  
The EC in the area of ICT and communication list most of their goals and methods under the policy 
flagship ‘Digital Agenda for Europe’ for the Horizon 2020 project. Their competences vary from 
regional areas and are, contrary to other policy areas, rather asymmetrical depending on geographical 
locations (European Commission, 2014c). As such EC authority varies from geographic area rather 
than on basis of policy. Overall their goal is to promote regulation that is compatible with the EU legal 
framework, act as space or information for European ICT industries and promote international 
cooperation in research and innovation (European Commission, 2014c). 
Areas in direct proximity to the EU outer borders have most of their ICT negotiations done either 
through accession negotiations covering potential enlargement or via the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) (European Commission, 2014g). Both of these fields are naturally much broader than 
simply ICT negotiations but as no framework for these types of questions yet exist they are done 
through these processes. EC authority within accession and enlargement is very limited as they are 
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bound by decision from the European Council for actual accession and by the Aquis Communitaire 
regarding what is actually negotiated. As such what can be agreed upon is all codified in chapter 10 of 
the Aquis which needs to be fully adopted before accession (European Commission, 2014g). The EC 
is limited to a monitoring role as enlargement is a politically sensitive area. Regarding the ENP the EC 
has become mainly side-lined in favour of the European External Action Service (EAS) (European 
External Action Service, 2014z). As such the EC no longer has any authority regarding the 
negotiations with these countries in specific. In this geographical area this leaves Russia, in which the 
on-going dialogue between the EU and the Russian Federation contains the sectorial dialogue on the 
information society in which negotiations are handled by the European Commission Directorate-
General CONNECT with the Russian Ministry for Telecom (European Strategic Partnerships 
Observatory, 2014). The outcome of these negotiations is discussed during the ministerial meetings 
and the EU-Russia summits twice a year (European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, 2014). 
Currently EU-Russia relations are not optimal and such negotiations have less than productive 
outcomes. 
In terms of African geographical zone the EU’s target is mostly aimed at ICT development and 
subsequently harmonisation of African regulations with EU regulations. EU negotiations are carried 
out with the African Union (AU). However, most negotiations with African states are carried out 
through the International Telecommunication Union (European Commission, 2014d). Not being a 
private agent or a sovereign nation-state the EU is not eligible for membership and as such 
negotiations are carried out on a ministerial basis where the member-states act on their own. 
Nevertheless ITU projects in Africa are often financially supported through the EU on basis of EC 
decisions (European Commission, 2014d). 
As has been discussed previously a DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) which 
covers digital issues already exists with Canada and another one is being discussed with the US (part 
of the DCFTA known as TTIP). The condition surrounding DCFTAs have been discussed before. As 
TTIP has not yet been accepted ICT negotiations have been carried out by the Directorate General 
CONNECT through the EU representation in Washington D.C. which meets with the US department 
of State on an annual basis (European Commission, 2014e); a dialogue very similar to that which is 
held with Russia. 
Regarding Latin America plans are in motion for a submarine fibre-optic cable to Europe. The 
commission is involved in a number of different international regulatory networks in connection with 
ICT (Such as Regulatel and REDCLARA). (European Commission, 2014e) The EC is also a 
participant in UN discussions on the subject. Three countries have special involvement from the EC. 
Brazil cooperates with the commission through the EU delegation to Brasilia on topic of higher 
performance and cloud computing (European Commission, 2014e). Mexico is being advised by the 
commission on deregulating their telecommunications sector. The EC is here in contact with their 
national telecoms regulatory institution (IFETEL). In Colombia the EC provides financial aid for the 
country to develop its digital video broadcasting technology (European Commission, 2014e). 
Relations in Asia is mainly based on bilateral negotiations with the exception of direct cooperation 
with ASEAN which is a multilateral organisation modelled closely to the EU. The EU has a specific 
instrument in place for relations called READI. The instrument is a useful resource to harmonise with 
the annual ASEAN meetings concerning telecom. Horizon 2020 (and thereby Digital Agenda for 
Europe) allows ASEAN member states to participate if willing (European Commission, 2014f).  
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Bilateral negotiations are carried out with China, India, Japan and South Korea. In the first three 
instances the Commission is in direct contact with their national ministries to try to identify common 
challenges facing the regions. In the case of China, several common working groups have been 
established. In South Korea, the cooperation is mainly business driven but the EC admits to have plans 
to establish a working relationship with their ministry as well (European Commission, 2014f). On a 
higher political level, ICT is discussed during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in which the EC and 
the Member Stats are present to discuss issues on a very broad scope. Finally, the EC also provides 
financial aid for development and information exchange between research groups and students in the 
area of ICT through the Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN) (European Commission, 2014f). 
It is difficult to talk about the EC as capacity retainers in this area as the area itself is new. As 
previously discussed, time is a factor when it comes to retention of capacity vs the EEAS. In this sense 
the EC actually has less influence than the EEAS in this specific area as Cyber Defense is seen as such 
an important area and it has in the normal fashion been possible to pick up by the EEAS for two 
reasons. It is a defense issue which the EEAS is very good at influencing and it is a new issue which 
means it is not an issue the EC has the normally superior resources in. This leaves mandate, which in 
this case is mostly, like in energy, a manner of facilitating cooperation with external actors. As in 
Energy the EC is shut out of many important negotiations due to the forums they take place as the EU 
is not considered a state. This concerns both Africa and the European Neighbourhood Area. It is safe 
to say that retention has not worked as well in ICT as in in other areas. 
Aid and Development: The Investor 
The Commission authority in EuropeAid and development policies is very much bound to its 
obligations and limit according to the Lisbon Treaty. Its first task is to write legislation to initiate the 
legislative procedure around development and aid. If adopted by the council and the parliament the 
sums and general aims are created. Loans and financial support are given to the commission from the 
European Investment Bank (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014h). Other than this the EC has control 
over the implementation process and the structure of the actual aid grants, budget support and sector 
support (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014a). Here it is only limited by the control of its reports 
which is done by the court of auditors (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014h). 
The EC’s authority over development aid is mostly regulated by the beneficiary state or organisation 
as the EC is naturally limited by the sovereignty of the beneficiary whenever aid is carried out 
externally. In these cases it is a matter of what form the aid takes. EuropeAid is providing in three 
forms: Grants and Contracts, Budget support and Sector support (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 
2014a). 
In the case of Grants, the EC is the initiator, proposing to finance third party entities that are often 
invested in aid operations. The EC may in this case entirely finance or carry out operations but usually 
require the beneficiary to finance half of the activity with the other half coming from the development 
fund or the EU budget (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014b). What is produced from the activities is 
entirely the property of the receiving entity and grants are not to be seen rewards rather as 
reimbursement for the costs. The EC is also limited to offer Aid to areas which are stated as being part 
of the EU’s external aid programmes which is laid out on the political level. In this case a written 
agreement between the two parties is required (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014b). If the project 
would have specific needs, or require something which they cannot receive from monetary support 
EuropeAid may aid by making a call for tender (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014e). If the EC finds 
someone who may assist with the service, supplies or specific work expertise a contract may be 
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created in which the EU pays for the specific service in question (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 
2014j). 
In other cases Direct Budget Support may be carried out (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014a). The 
use for this are primarily for two reasons: Either the issues are better identified by the beneficiary 
country or full ownership of the project is preferred by the receiving country (Directorate-General, 
DEVCO, 2014c). While the EC assesses and carries out dialogue with the receiver, the funds are 
transferred to their treasury and the EC has no power over how they are used (Directorate-General, 
DEVCO, 2014a). This method builds on transparency and funds are not given unless the receiver is 
fully committed to democratic values and human rights as well as having a stable economic system 
and sufficient transparency into how funds are spent (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014c) 
(Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014d). 
The final form of funding; sector support, is a form of mixture of both. With this structure the project 
is also government-owned but the project needs to be on one of the EU’s target sectors and therefore 
narrower than budget support. Sector support can receive aid from any of the previous forms of 
support and aims to support already existing government programs (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 
2014a). The sectors assisted are under Human Rights and Governance, Food and Agriculture, 
Economic Growth, Human Development, Infrastructure, Environment, Energy, Health and education 
(Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014i). This form allows the EC better control and influence of the 
projects. 
As has been noted the European Commission enjoys quite a degree of freedom here when it is not 
limited by the beneficiaries. They are limited by the legislators in various forms, however. Regular 
reports have to be delivered to the council and the EP and it has to be verified by the court of auditors 
(Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014h). Furthermore the framework laid out by the legislator is 
limiting in term of sectors. For example; half of the budget is earmarked for Africa, this part has to be 
spent on Africa and no less than 50% can be spent on Africa (Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014f). 
Finally, the commission also has to fulfil other specific non-geographical directives which include 
analysing and formulating the written formulation of the policy. Focus on increasing the effectiveness 
of aid and carry out international dialogue with the aim of increasing the EUs influence in aid work. 
The EC is also responsible for managing the human resources in this area (Directorate-General, 
DEVCO, 2014g). Furthermore, the EC is not to be involved with building relations with the 
beneficiary country but at this point ownership of a project needs to be turned over to the EEAS 
(Directorate-General, DEVCO, 2014h). 
It could be argued that the EC has done well to retain their control over finance. This is because the 
EU is the largest aid donor in the world today as such being the one to hold the money is significant in 
the case of external relations in this case. On one hand this allows the EC to be the main institutions 
third party countries seek to negotiate with in order to convince the EU of an investment but and on 
the other it makes the EC the long-term presence in external relations with the third party. This is 
capacity through both mandate and resources. Still, in this area the EEAS finds one of the places 
where mandate works in its favour. In its role of representing the EU abroad it is specified that the EC 
may not use its resources in this area to deal with external relations directly. This is to be handed over 
to EEAS in order to improve relations. While the EC has certainly managed to retain most of this area 
through its resources by getting to handle the money with the expertise of knowing how to spend it 
and the contacts needed to supply the experts that make aid work it has perhaps lost its main function 
simply through mandate of the Lisbon treaty. 
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Transport: The Forum Builder 
By its very nature, and due to globalization, transport, like communication has become an issue which 
has been integrated outside of the borders of the nation-state and even the European Union. While the 
EU and EC pursue a Single European Transport Area (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012a) they also 
use methods to reach to third party countries to reach their goals in the policy area of transport 
(Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012b). EU transport policy on the international level is divided into 
bilateral relations and regional cooperation (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012f) as well as 
cooperation with some IOs in relation to Aviation Safety Policy (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2014b). 
Long-term regional cooperation is in effect with the ENP region, Africa, Caucasus (Central Asia, 
countries referred by the EU) and EUROMED (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) (Directorate-General, 
MOVE, 2012f). In terms of bilateral relations the EU focuses on the four partners of China, India, 
Russia and the US (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012f). 
Relations with Africa has seen little improvement in the years following 2009 which was the last year 
a communication with transport concerns was published by the EC (Directorate-General, MOVE, 
2012d). The communication mostly sets out to establish what tools are at the EU’s disposal in 
mapping and prospecting the area for ease of transport. This involves mostly projects covered under 
development (European Commission, 2009, p. 12). Concretely they wish for an informal forum for 
transport within the EU-African Partnership (European Commission, 2009, p. 13). It is to focus on 
intertwining African infrastructure and transport Networks with the European essential TEN-T 
transport network. However, little outside of the ENP and EUROMED is being done or even has 
concrete plans. Due to the lack of things being done it is difficult to assess the function of the EC, but 
it is implied that discussions are taking place under the EU-Africa partnership summits. 
In relation to EUROMED, a formal transport forum exists under the EUROMED Transport Project 
which has been set up based on an extensive Blue Paper created under the 2005 November 
proceedings of the EUROMED transport ministerial conferences (EUROMED Transport Project, 
2005). The project is still on-going and covers a wide area of tailored approaches on transport in all 
countries around the Mediterranean (excluding Syria) (EUROMED Transport Project, 2014). Now 
operating under a 2007-2013 action plan which has been extended due to financial concerns beginning 
2009 (EUROMED Transport Project, 2007). The EC’s function is peripheral, providing technical 
assistance to the EUROMED transport forum, but is extended due to the Blue paper integrating 
environmental and socio-economic concerns (EUROMED Transport Project, 2014). 
The Caucasus/Central Asia relations are formed in the spirit of the EU enlargement project. Currently 
integration of the European TEN-T network into the South East Core Regional Transport network is 
on the Agenda for the South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO) (Directorate-General, 
MOVE, 2012f). SEETO was created in 2004 by the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as well as the EC and 
the UN mission in the area. While there are ministerial meetings every years the process has been 
halted. The EC attempted to set up a Transport Community with the Western Balkans and negotiated 
in order for the treaty on the community to be signed but the negotiations failed due to political 
differences (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012f). The attention of the EC for further tension of the 
TEN-T network therefore turned to the accession negotiations with Turkey as it has a strategic 
location in terms of transport. As the Accession discussions with Turkey are also halted development 
is currently very slow in the Caucasus/Central Asia Area (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012f). 
Due to somewhat stalled development in these areas the EC encouraged the Transport Council to 
renew the approach in 2011. Transport network integration is now moving forward in the Easter 
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partnership Transport Panel set up in September 2011 including the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The panel is not run by the EC, however, but is an 
information exchange tool between member states and the partnership countries (Directorate-General, 
MOVE, 2014a). 
The EC cooperates with China on several areas of transport. As an overarching dialogue the EU-China 
summit in Beijing 2005 the Dialogue on Strategies in the Transport and Energy Sectors was created 
between the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and DG TREN. Agreements 
have been concluded on Maritime navigation and satellite navigation. Aviation has been negotiated 
since 2005 but has not reached a conclusion yet. Little development with China has happened since 
2006 in these sectors (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012c). The same is true for India and Russia 
where dialogues have been set up but little has been achieved in terms of agreements (Directorate-
General, MOVE, 2012e) (European Commission and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian 
Federation, 2005). The cooperation agreements with the USA have from the beginning been very 
focused at security. As official summits and joint statements were first issued in 2003 the EC connects 
this to the increased security agenda of the US after the 9/11 attacks. As a direct effect most 
agreements have been issued in regards to air traffic. However, as security have been on the agenda 
the EC have had little effect lately as external security issues are mostly handled by the EAS which 
was established after some of these statements (Directorate-General, MOVE, 2012g). The EC is 
negotiating the DCFTA TTIP, on the other hand, which sets out the future of especially aviation 
between the EU and US once completed. 
In conclusion the EC has little authority and little effectiveness in the area of transport in recent years. 
There have either been political differences or lack of common grounds in the negotiations that have 
been carried out. It is possible that this is partly affected by the EC losing influence over important 
areas in transport such as security to the EEAS. Furthermore, the EEAS taking control over the 
diplomatic service has made dialogue options on a bilateral level scarce. Retention is difficult to 
discuss in this area since transport is not well developed by either party. It is fair to say the attempts of 
the EC to build forums and set up dialogues in the area with multiple parties, especially in the 
neighboring areas would eventually lead to a more active role taken by the EC, however, the area is 
unstable and member states take security seriously. Frosty relations to the east coupled with instability 
and war in the south has crippled the ability for development in the transport area. Technically one 
could say that the EC is retaining this area due to its limitations, the dialogues, if proven successful in 
the future will show that the EC has been able to structure the area in such a way that it promotes the 
position of the EC. 
CSDP and CFSP 
The European Commission is not the guiding institution within external action and is legally not 
powerful in the common Security and defense policy. However, due to the different agencies within 
the EU needing the ECs guidance and expertise it is quite often involved in making external policy 
decisions in an indirect way. In many cases the external security measures and decisions are difficult 
to distinguish from the internal making the EC a capable player in this area. The European 
Commission tries to follow on with security issues on an external level through the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in third party countries as it has competences within these areas. The EU 
strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy effectively sets out the areas 
in which the Commission has and does not have authority to act (Council of the European Union, 
2012). 
Simon	Axbrink	Jönsson	 	 STVM23	
Department	of	Political	Science	 	 Tutor:	Magnus	Jerneck	
30	
The Commission is in charge of Directorate General ECHO responsible for implementation, operation 
and delivery of humanitarian aid and civil protection (European External Action Service, 2015s). This 
includes actions protecting civilians in disaster areas like Nepal, the countries faced with Ebola and 
conflict zones like Syria, Ukraine and South Sudan (ECHO, European Commission, 2015). 
In terms of diplomatic actions it is implementing the ‘Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized 
and other high-income countries and territories’ (ICI) in which it promotes the EU visibility, business 
cooperation with European companies and creates common understandings in education and civil 
society dialogues (European External Action Service, 2013). 
The Commission is in charge of the long-term part of the Instrument for Stability. In which it 
promotes conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building (European External Action 
Service, 2015t). Alongside the EEAS it also developed the Cyber Security Strategy (European 
External Action Service, 2013). 
Unlike many other policy areas the division of capacity between the EEAS and the EC in CFSP is 
much more clearly defined. Since direct foreign relations are often done by MS leaders or by Frederica 
Mogherini, High Representative of Foreign Policy, the EC has submitted their expertise to be used by 
her in this case (Council of the European Union, 2012). This, by mandate, places the HR in charge of 
the EC in many of these affairs raising the authority of the EEAS as the handlers of CFSP. In most 
cases CFSP involvement of the EC concerns long-term plans and stability of third world countries 
requiring assistance. The EEAS in this case supports with short-term missions and sometimes military 
involvement while the EC makes sure to stabilize what the EEAS creates. 
By mandate, the EC does not hold much power in direct relation-building but it is by resources and 
expertise it may affect policy, as well as tie-ins with other policy areas. The HR requires the EC’s 
assistance to have effect due to their importance in other policy areas closely related to CFSP as the 
EEAS is the diplomatic service relations are often done through trade agreements and aid; both of 
which are placed in the hands of the EC. Effectively, the two most important tools of Foreign Policy 
helps the EC retain their role as a player in external relations. Furthermore; most multilateral 
negotiations where the HR could be very effective by being a source of unity to rally around are 
almost exclusively carried out by the Commission and the HR is not always present. Ironically the 
creation of the HR position and establishing her as a single voice for the European Union foreign 
policy has through the division of capacity into the two branches of foreign policy in the EC and the 
EEAS had more of a crippling than a beneficial effect as they are inescapably interlinked when they 
attempt to be effective tools of external relations.  
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Discussion 
A discussion around the research question will inevitable take its beginning in the Lisbon Treaty due 
to it being the starting point of changes to the Europeans Commissions position in external relations. 
In its essence, the changes that occurred are all related to the mandate given to the European 
Commission. It is no longer in its formal power to represent the European Union abroad. European 
Commission functions which still allow the European Commission to be a major player in external 
relations are as such all sources of power retention for the European Commission. In this paper the 
major distinction that has been made is between mandate to retain power, which is considered to be 
formal, and resources to retain power which are more informal.   
An original presumption must be to dispel the illusion that sources of retention can be easily listed as 
the two functions that has been described. In the vast majority of cases we see a combination of factors 
working together to extend the ECs authority. In cases where the EC can use its resources to act in 
external relations we often see a strong connection to path dependency under the historical 
institutionalist theory. In concrete examples we may look at energy where the European Commission’s 
information gathering function cause the council to consult the Commission to construct a coherency 
mechanism for the European Union’s energy trade abroad. Although coherency in external relations is 
an EEAS authority the council normally consults with the EC and is thus more likely to do so again as 
EC is capable of carrying out its extended function due to its expertise-related resources. Mandate is 
such overwritten by a combination of the council preferring to consult with an institution which has 
been successful in resolving these types of issues in the past and the ECs having the ability to fulfil the 
function required. This builds inertia where the EEAS is hindered from the start to carry out its 
intended function. For each time this process is being repeated the EC grows stronger and retains more 
power. An example of how far this process has come can be seen through the European Energy 
Security strategy. One of the areas the EEAS has been more successful in influencing has been 
security. Yet, the security strategy is produced by the European Commission. 
Similarly, path dependency also affects the EC’s position in climate debate. This is partly because it is 
connected to energy, making the EC implemented expertise in Energy being useful in climate issues 
and partly because of the nature of climate summits. The EC set out the basis of EU external actions 
on climate change in 2005 when the EU was still represented by the commission. The strategy set out 
a road map until 2012 (Directorate-General, CLIMA, 2014b). In 2010 binding resolutions were drawn 
up, monitored and enforced by the commission. Because of these resolutions external action has to be 
done on basis of these agreements as the member states are required by law to abide by the EU 
regulations. As such, the Commission has put itself in a spot where it is needed to carry out 
negotiations with third party countries. The initial path dependency established 2005 eventually 
strengthened itself into legal mandate. Until 2020, the EEAS cannot take any action without relying on 
the Commission. As with energy, only even more successful the EC has remained major player in 
climate policy due to its ability to bind the policy area to long-term goals following a set plan; its 
objectives being further developed and extended by the commission.  
This process sped on by path dependency is known as a policy legacy. While there is no more mandate 
the continuing path dependency creates a policy legacy which the council continues to express by 
relying on the commission. As noted by DG CLIMA the Commission’s role conception is much that 
of a negotiator in world affairs around climate change. The conception is fulfilled via the expectation 
of the council for the commission to be the primary arbiter for policy coherence among the EU 
countries. Its role performance can be seen as nothing but high due to the fact that it has attained the 
ability to be part of conferences as a representative for the EU (although it has had to share that 
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responsibility with the HR as of recently). As long as the EC can retain its control over union long-
term policy coherence and general policy direction it will be a major player in these policy areas. The 
only threat to this are policy issues that are not covered by the EC’s current policies. Such policy 
issues are given to the institution with the majority of mandate in the area. Such will often be given to 
the High Representative. 
In the area of trade, the EC has had to apply very little of its retention capacity. The reason, of course 
being that the EU has exclusive mandate. As such, trade has become an area where mandate is the 
main source of power retention. The direct effect is that the treaty need to apply specific mandate to 
have an exception to commission control in this area. This has happened in relations to arms export, 
sanctions etc. Where retention is near secured by the commission a discussion around theory provides 
little of value though it could prove useful should there be a treaty revision. However, the effect of 
trade on other policy areas may be required. 
Due to the legal mandate the commission can be viewed to attempt to bind this policy area to other 
policy areas as it would give them legal mandate to act in other policy areas as well. This would 
strengthen their ability for power retention in other areas. This can be seen in the case of ICT and 
communications for example. A relatively new policy area it should be an area which the Commission 
would have little success in influencing as there can be no retention in an undeveloped policy area. 
However, ideas around ICT and Communications have come up as an issue in trade agreements 
discussed by the EC. For example, they are an integrated part in the DCFTA (Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) with Canada. The fluency of said policy area is benefitting the 
EC as can be seen by the fact that when institutions do exist (such as the ITU) the EC often cannot act. 
Instead attempts are being made to create trade agreements extending the EC’s mandate to this policy 
area. Institutional overlapping is used in order to retain and acquire power. Power retention in this area 
is as such much more due to mandate than may be apparent. 
The role expectation of the council for the commission in trade would be to take initiative and 
facilitate deals which are of value to the Union and act in defense of the union in immediate changes 
to the world market. The role of the Union’s regulator and leader. The expectation in this area matches 
the commission’s role conception. Due to its ability to secure Free Trade Agreements the performance 
is very high and allows the Commission to overstep into other policy areas. In ICT and 
Communication on the other hand the Role expectation is that of advisor to the EEAS on digital 
security issues. While the Union itself sees itself in the role of a policy enabler. The performance 
ranges from strong to weak based on geographical area and pre-existing institutions and the EC’s 
ability to bind agreements through overlapping into areas where the EC has a greater mandate. 
As has been easy to see through the recently discussed policy areas the EC often promotes 
circumventing mandate through its use of sources of power retention made possible by unclear 
mandates. Regarding the area of aid and development on the other hand we see another trend. Synergy 
between the EC and the EEAS is working rather well through the division of timeframes. The EEAS 
takes care of short-term missions, military and civilian while the EC is responsible for long-term 
measures of aid and development efforts. The EC holds the money but may not use it to directly 
influence bilateral relations with a country but must leave that to the EEAS. The synergy works rather 
seemingly as the guidelines are firmly laid and resources are divided in such a way that neither 
institutions can overstep its mandate due to the lack of resources to carry out the functions of the other. 
The EC has no policing or military unit and may as such not carry out any intervention missions. The 
EEAS also has no control over the funding and may as such not carry out any investment or 
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development measures. At the same time the EC has no control over the bilateral negotiations as has 
been previously discussed. As such it hands over relations with the country when necessary to do so. 
EuropeAid is an example where the mandate works as intended as the overlap is minimal and the 
EEAS mandate is not as ambiguous as in other areas. Power retention in the intervention area has been 
impossible as intervention was a rather rare occurrence before the Lisbon Treaty and the EC has no 
retention sources here. Similarly, the EC has been allowed to keep most of its mandate in investment 
as such has had no need to use retention techniques to circumvent the EEAS. As has been discussed 
previously, one of the areas the EEAS has been effective in keeping is bilateral relations which the EC 
has shown no need of trying to control in this area. The EC also enjoys considerable freedom in how 
its spends the money as long as it does it within the guidelines given through the investment programs.  
As there is no ‘turf war’ in this area it also works rather well. The institutions mesh in a way intended 
and the EC carries out its function with little attempt to bind this policy area to other. It carries out its 
function as money-man and expertise on development issues. The Role conception and expectation are 
the same of the EC and its performance is thus very high.  
Transport is a good example of a policy area where retention has not worked well. Most transport 
policies or negotiations were carried out on a bilateral level. Not being in control over bilateral 
negotiations anymore the EC has been effectively shut out from the negotiations due to the EEAS 
taking over the diplomatic services. 
It could be perceived that the EC attempted to retain power in the in transport policies through its 
involvement in the European Neighbourhood area. The European Neighbourhood Policy includes 
forums for discussion on transport policy for both eastern European Countries not yet ready for 
accession and the Mediterranean countries in the EUROMED partnership. While the multilateral 
nature of these negotiations and the previous involvement in the EC in these discussions would 
normally allow for retention through path dependency, institutional legacy and pre-existing expertise 
development in these areas have prevented this. Due to political development in the Mediterranean 
area and political unrest in Eastern Europe, especially concerning Georgia, Ukraine, Syria and most of 
Northern Africa there has not been enough policy coherence for the EC to bind policies to long-term 
commitments. This clearly demonstrates that the EC has difficulty dealing with unforeseen political 
circumstances. This is further clarified with the fact that in stable areas the EC has been successful 
(TTIP with the United States). In this single occurrence retention has been kept by overlap with the 
Trade policy area. 
Transport works as an example of the limitations of the ECs power for retention. When the EC has no 
mandate and fails to secure a policy area through overlapping issues or path dependency the EC have 
no other source for power retention. As such the Transport policy area is useful to map out the full 
extent of the ECs ability to retain power. It also points out the weaknesses of the EC when 
development is difficult to predict. Long-term negotiations such as the ones with the US highlights 
what the EC can successfully do to retain power.  
Role expectation of the Member States for the EC in the transport area has been low. The ECs role has 
mainly been to set up forums for the Member states to meet and discuss. The ECs Role conception has 
included to retain power and become a major player in the multilateral transport negotiations of the 
neighbouring countries of the EU. However, it is clear that the role performance in relation to the role 
conception has been very weak. The EC has failed to be major player in this area. 
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The policy area which most directly influences EU external actions is the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. While the EC is involved in this area in a major way due to it being the largest source 
of expertise and information in relation to the actions carried out its power is being limited by the 
constraints on its autonomy. The High Representative of Foreign Affairs is the spider in the web of 
external relations and coordinates the work of the EC and all other institutions in the CFSP. Due to her 
direct involvement in this area she turns to the EC to find information but she also restricts their ability 
to act by doing so as the institution that backs her up is supposed to be the EEAS. With no mandate the 
EC has to rely on the HR to affect external relations in security.  
The ECs performance in this area relates a great deal to its performance in transport. The EC has 
difficulties in retention in areas where fast action and development is expected. In this area path 
dependence is unlikely due to the flexibility required in decision making. There is little chance of 
institutional legacy to build as the HR is replaced every five years. The EC has all its mandate in 
handling money, but no mandate to handle it in relation to external relations. That falls to the HR. 
Consultation with the EC is also not required but the HR may choose to consult with them if she 
wishes. All in all it makes the EC be of little influence. It has not been able to retain much of its power 
here. As the area regards representation specifically the Lisbon Treaty has been effective in this regard. 
The Role expectation put on the European Commission in this policy area s to be a source of 
information and expertise in handling of external relations decision-making. The role conception is 
much the same as the EC takes no particular action to extend its mandate. As the Role conception does 
matches the expectation it performs well. The expectation and conception are not high, however. 
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Conclusion 
The European Commission employs a wide variety of methods to retain its position in European 
External Relations despite the Lisbon Treaty removing its formal position as the European Union’s 
representative abroad. 
In the majority of cases the European Commission utilizes a mixture of long-term policy goals to build 
trust and expertise-based legitimacy among EU decision-makers. The aim is to build a path 
dependency of consulting with the European Commission to present the outline of an EU position on 
external affairs. Whenever a new concern in a policy area comes up he path dependency contributes to 
an institutional legacy where the European Commission is consulted despite the European External 
Action Service’s mandate to negotiate on the issue. A wide variety of issues are such tied up in long-
term plans often decided upon before the creation of the EEAS in order for the European Commission 
to take future decisions on the matter due to their experience in the policy at hand. In time the goal is 
to be given formal mandate in the area by their plans becoming binding laws. 
In areas that are new of where the European Commission has not had long-term plans in place since 
before the creation of the EEAS the Commission will attempt to retain control of a policy area by 
using areas in which it has formal mandate and find an area in which the two policies overlap in order 
to inescapable link them together to give them mandate over both areas. Another way to achieve this is 
to tie the policy area to multi-lateral negotiations where the European Commission has greater 
authority than the EEAS which is mainly focused on bilateral negotiation in its role as the EU’s 
diplomatic service. 
Retention has a number of weaknesses. When unexpected or short-term situation occur where the EC 
has attempted to build long-term plans the EC fails to act accordingly as it has little room for 
flexibility or adapting to the circumstances. In such cases the EC often fails to retain the area and 
instead it will be claimed by the High Representative of Foreign Affairs or the EEAS which has better 
adaptability and flexibility. Retention is also weak in areas where EC mandate has been completely 
marginalized and is only called upon on a case-by-case basis. This also includes areas where most 
negotiations are carried out by bilateral or diplomatic relations. Finally, the EC is also unable to retain 
power in areas which are new, or has developed rapidly recently, as the it has no experience or 
expertise to call on in such cases. 
In conclusion, the European Commission has been able to remain a major player in European external 
relations by using all available sources of power and institutional structure as well as legitimacy 
created by expertise to retain power in policy areas it had previously been in control over before the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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